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CHARLES M. KNEIER
The extension of municipal activities in the United States
presents both the question of policy and the question of legal
power or right. The legal phase becomes of special significance
as the city enters those fields of activity which are not strictly
governmental but are rather corporate in their nature. The
engagement of a city in such activities is attacked as being other
than a proper municipal function, and as being taxation for
other than a public purpose.
A consideration of the attitude of the courts towards this
question shows a changing attitude, tending to become more
liberal, due in part probably, to the need of meeting the changed
conditions and problems of the time. The principle is established
that a city can tax its inhabitants only for public purposes;
taxation for other than public purposes is unconstitutional.2
While the courts are agreed that taxes may be levied only for
public purposes, they are not agreed upon what principles to
determine whether a thing is for a public purpose, and con-
sequently they have been unable to agree whether certain things
are, or are not, public purposes. They do seem to be fairly well
agreed that it is not possible to lay down definite principles by
which they may test each case as it arises to determine whether
it is for a public purpose.
'Opinion of the Justices, 155 Mass. 598, 3o N. E. iI42 (1892); King-
man v. City of Brockton, 153 Mass. 255, 26 N. E. 998 (189 i ) ; Opinion of the
Justices, i5o Mass. 592, 24 N. E. 1O84 (i89o); Lowell v. Boston, iii Mass.
454 (1873) ; State v. Osawkee Township, 14 Kan- 418 (1875) ; Mather v. City
of Ottawa, 114 Ill. 659, 3 N. E. 216 (1885) ; Loan Association v. Topeka, 20
Wall. 655 (U. S. 1875); Cole v. La Grange, I13 U. S. I (1885); Ottawa v.
Cary, io8 U. S. Iio (1883); Attorney General v. Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 400
(1875) ; State v. Eau Claire, 40 Wis. 533 (1876); Allen v. Jay, 6o Me. 124
(1872) ; Opinion of the Justices, 58 Me. 590 (1871).
2 Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112 (1896); Strick-
ley v. Mining Co., 2oo U. S. 527 (19o6) ; Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U. S.
217 (1917); Dodge v. Mission Township, 107 Fed. 827 (C. C. A. 8th, i9oi);
Opinion of the Justices, i9o Mass. 611, 77 N. E. 820 (19o6) ; Coates v. Camp-
bell, 37 Minn. 498, 35 N. W. 366 (1887); Woodall v. Darst, 71 W. Va. 350,
77 S. E. 264 (1913).
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In Loan Association v. Topek, 2a Justice Miller, in consid-
ering whether a tax was for a public or private purpose, held
that the courts "must be governed mainly by the course and usage
of the government, the objects for which taxes have been cus-
tomarily and by long course of legislation levied, what objects
or purposes have been considered necessary to the support and
for the proper use of the government, whether state or munic-
ipal." judge Cooley in an opinion dealing with this question,
held that "necessity is .not the governing consideration" in con-
sidering whether taxation is for a public purpose. As applied
to taxation, public purpose was held to have "no relation to the
urgency of the public need, or to the extent of the public benefit
which is to follow. It is, on the other hand, merely a term of
classification, to distinguish the objects for which, according to
settled usage, the government is to provide, from those which,
by like usage, are left to private inclination, interest or liber-
ality." 3 In both of these cases the court emphasizes settled usage
in determining whether a tax is for a public purpose. But to
follow precedent and allow only those things to be done which
have been done in the past "would be essentially vicious and er-
roneous. Growth and extension are as necessary in the domain
of municipal action as in the domain of law." ' It would be a
narrow, if not dangerous, interpretation to put upon the funda-
mental law to hold that cities may employ only those methods and
agencies which have proved adequate in the past.'
The question of whether a function is a public purpose "is
a changing question, changing to suit industrial inventions and
developments and to meet new social conditions." 6 For that
reason it would be impossible to lay down with minute detail an
" Supra note I.
' People v. Salem, 20 Mich. 452 (I87O). In State v. Orear, 277 Mo. 303,
210 S. W. 392 (igig), the Supreme Court of Missouri said that the question
of whether a business is public or private depends upon "whether such business
is sanctioned by time and the acquiescence of the people as being public or
private."
'Sun Printing & Publishing Association v. New York, 8 App. Div. 23o,
4o N. Y. Supp. 607 (1886) ; aft'd, 152 N. Y. 257, 46 N. E. 499 (1897).
5Ibid.
'City of Tombstone v. Macia, 245 Pac. 677, 68o (Ariz. 1926).
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inexorable rule distinguishing public from private purposes.
7
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has pointed out that times
change and with them the wants and necessities of the people;
"what was clearly a public use a century ago may, because of
changed conditions, have ceased to be such today." The court
went on to say that "what could not be deemed a public use a
century ago may, because of changed economic and industrial
conditions, be such today."
If a project is undertaken merely for gain or for private
objects it is not for a public purpose; "Gain or loss may inci-
dentally follow, but the purpose must be primarily to satisfy
the need, or contribute to the convenience, of the people of the
city at large."" Although the advancement of the public welfare
may result incidentally, the promotion of the interests of indi-
viduals, either in respect of property or business, "is, in its es-
sential character, a private and not a public object."
In view of the limitation of taxation only for a public pur-
pose, how far have cities been allowed to assume proprietary
functions and enter into the fields of privati business? The
municipal ownership of waterworks,9 and electric lighting plants 0
have in practically all cases received the approval of the courts.
The supplying by cities of their citizens with natural gas is also a
public purpose for which the taxing power may be used."- The
Supreme Court of Ohio has held that "heat being an agent or
principle indispensable to health, comfort, and convenience of
every inhabitant of our cities" it cannot see why "through the
"Laughlin v. Portland, iii Me. 486, go At. 318 (0914).
'Sun Printing, etc. v. New York, supra note 4.
'Reddall v. Bryan, 14 Md. 444 (1859); Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218
U. S. 18o (igio); Colby University v. Canandaigua, 69 Fed. 671 (N. D. N. Y.
1895) ; Augusta v. Augusta Water District, ioi Me. 148, 63 AtI. 663 (igo6).
1*Linn v. Chambersburg, 16o Pa. 511, 28 Atl. 842 (894); Crawfords-
ville v. Braden, 130 Ind. 149, 28 N. E. 849 (i8gi); Opinion of the Justices,
15o Mass. 592, 24 N. E. 1O84 (i89o); Thompson Houston Electric Co. v.
City of Newton, 42 Fed. 723 (S. D. Iowa i8go) ; Jacksonville Electric Light
Co. v. City of Jacksonville, 36 Fla. 229, 18 So. 677 (895). Contra: Mauldin
v. Greenville, 33 S. C. i, ii S. E. 434 (i89o).
11 Hamilton Gaslight & Coke Company v. City of Hamilton, 146 U. S.
258 (1892); Indianapolis v. Consumers' Gas Trust Co., 144 Fed. 640 (C. C.
A. 7th, i9o6); Opinion of the Justices, supra note io.
MUNICIPAL FUNCTIONS
medium of natural gas, it may not be as much a public service
to furnish it to the citizens as to furnish water." 12
The right of a city to operate a street railway has also been
questioned as not being a public purpose. The courts have, how-
ever, held that "the means of transportation for people at large
is a matter of public interest" 13 and a "city purpose," 14 and a
proper municipal function.' 5 The right of the city of Cincinnati
to tax the property of its citizens to construct The Cincinnati
Southern Railway was upheld even though it extended several
hundred miles in length. 6 An underground street railway is a
public purpose;17 the same principle has been held to apply to
the construction of a subway, which, when completed, was to
be leased to a street railway company.'3
Other proper municipal functions are the ownership and
operation of ferries,19 wharves, 20  and municipal markets.
21
Where the activity has as its end the promotion of the health or
general welfare the function is more clearly a public purpose ;22
this would justify the municipal ownership of a hospital.23  A
statute has also been upheld which authorized cities to provide
public baths and "to establish rates for the use of such baths."24
"State v. Toledo, 48 Ohio 12, 26 N. E. io6i (i8gi) ; also see State v.
City of Hamilton, 47 Ohio 52, 23 N. E. 935 (895).
' Opinion of the Justices, 231 Mass. 6o3, 122 N. E. 763 (IgIg).
U Sun Printing, etc. v. New York, supra note 4; City of New York v.
Brooklyn City R. R., 232 N. Y. 463, 134 N. E. 533 (1922).
"Platt v. San Francisco, 158 Cal. 74, 1IO Pac. 304 (igo) ; State v. Weiler.
ioi Ohio 123, 128 N. E. 88 (192o) ; Tulloch v. City of Seattle, 67 Wash. 178,
124 Pac. 481 (1912) (Held invalid on other grounds).
"Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio 14 (1871).
'Sun Printing, etc. v. New York, supra note 4.
s Prince v. Crocker, 166 Mass. 347, 44 N. E. 446 (1896) ; Brown v. Tur-
ner, 176 Mass. 9, 56 N. E. 969 (igoo); Admiral Realty Co. v. City of New
York, 2o6 N. Y. iO, 99 N. E. 241 (1912).
"Attorney General v. Boston, x23 Mass. 46o (1877).
" Hafner v. St. Louis, 161 Mo. 34, 61 S. W. 632 (19O) ; Nicholls v. Char-
levoix Circuit Judge, 155 Mich. 455, I2O N. W. 343 (igog).
'Spaulding v. Lowell, 40 Mass. 7I (1839); Bank v. Bell, 62 Cal. App.
320, 217 Pac. 538 (1923).
'Several cities own abattoirs.
' State v. Madison, 7 Wis. 688 (1858); Allentown v. Wagner, 214 Pa.
21o, 63 Atl. 697 (i9o6).
2" Bolster v. Lawrence, 225 Mass. 387, 114 N. E. 722 (1917).
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Municipally owned swimming pools, at which charges are made,
are now quite common, the question of their being for a public
purpose not seeming to have arisen.
A municipal function concerning which the question of
public purpose has had a more important part is that of fuel
yards. In the earlier cases which were brought before the
courts it was held that a city could not engage in the sale of
fuel as it was a commodity which was, and could be, easily
furnished by private competitive, enterprise. The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in an advisory opinion rendered
in 1892, held that it was unaware of any necessity why cities
and towns should undertake this form of business, any more
than many others which had always been conducted by private
enterprise.25 In an opinion handed down in 1903, the court re-
iterated this point of view, but held that where, by reason of
the supply of fuel being so small and the difficulty of obtaining
it so great, persons desiring it were unable to supply themselves
through private enterprise, the city could constitute itself an
agent for the relief of the community, and money expended for
that purpose would be for a public use. 26 The Michigan Supreme
Court in 19o6 refused to uphold the power of a city to engage
in the coal business even in case of emergency; such use of the
money of the city was not for a public purpose.2 T The unlawful
conduct of coal dealers to enhance, regulate, and control the
price of coal was not accepted as an excuse for the city entering
this new field of activity. While a city might provide coal for
its needy citizens, where, as in this case, a coal famine appeared
imminent, it could not enter into a commercial enterprise, such as
buying and selling coal to its citizens as a business, thereby enter-
ing into competition with dealers in coal.
Later decisions of the courts seem to have established the
'Opinion of the Justices, 155 Mass. 59 8 , 30 N. E. 1142 (1892). Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, later of the United States Supreme Court, dissented,
holding that fuel was an article of public necessity and could be so supplied.
'Opinion of the Justices, 182 Mass. 605, 66 N. E. 25 (igo3). A dis-
senting opinion refused to accept the emergency exception.
' Baker v. City of Grand Rapids, 142 Mich. 687, io6 N. W. 208 (i9o6).
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principle that cities may establish and operate fuel yards.28  The
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in a case before it in 1914
reasoned that if a city can have a central gas, electric, or heat-
ing plant, it can sell heat in another form, namely coal; "it is
only a different and simpler mode of distribution." 20 The
court laid down two tests of a public purpose: first, the subject
matter, or commodity, must be one of "public necessity, con-
venience, and welfare;" second, the difficulty of individuals in
providing it for themselves. In the case of fuel, the practical
difficulty laid down in the second test was caused by the existence
of monopolistic conditions. The argument was made before the
court that if a city can establish a fuel yard it could enter upon
any kind of commercial enterprise and carry on a grocery store,
or a meat market, or a bakery. The court said that this did not
follow for two reasons: first, fuel was an indispensable necessity
of life for which there were no substitutes; and in the second
place, under present economic conditions the other things were
regulated by competition, but in the case of a fuel yard, "The
element of commercial enterprise is entirely lacking." 30
The question was later brought before the Supreme Court
of the United States which upheld the right of municipalities to
establish fuel yards.3 1 The court pointed out that while ultimate
authority to determine the validity of legislation under the Four-
teenth Amendment rested in it, local conditions were of such
varying character that "what is or what is not a public use in a
particular state is manifestly a matter respecting which local
authority, legislative and judicial, has peculiar facilities for se-
curing accurate information;" for that reason, "the judgment
of the highest court of the state upon what should be deemed
a public use in a particular state is entitled to the highest respect"
' In Consumers' Coal Co. v. City of Lincoln, Io9g Neb. 51, 189 N. W. 643
(I922), the Supreme Court of Nebraska, while holding the maintenance of a
fuel yard to be a public purpose, held that the establishment of such was
not within the powers granted to the council of the city of Lincoln. The case
was a question of the interpretation of the home rule charter of the city.
"Laughlin v. Portland, supra note 7.
'The right of a city to establish a fuel yard was again upheld in Jones
v. Portland, 113 Me. 123, 93 Atl. 41 (1915).
'Jones v. Portland, supra note 2.
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and a decision of the highest court of a state, declaring a use to
be public in its nature is accepted unless clearly not well founded.
2
With this in view, the court was unable to say that the statute
under consideration violated rights of the taxpayer by taking his
property for uses which were private.38
This question was before the Supreme Court of Minnesota
in 1922.34 The right of municipalities to own and operate fuel
yards was upheld, the court pointing out that many municipal
activities, the propriety of which is not now questioned, were at
one time thought, and rightly so, to be of a private character,
. . . "The constitutional provision that taxes can be levied
only for public purposes remains; but conditions which go to
make a purpose public change." a
Another municipal function upon which the courts are not
agreed as to whether it is a public purpose is that of operating
ice plants. The question was first presented to the Supreme
Court of Georgia in 1910 ;36 the right of a city to operate an ice
plant was upheld as being a public purpose. The court reasoned
that if it was a public purpose for a city to furnish heat to itg
citizens in a cold climate it was just as mtuch a public purpose to
furnish ice in a hot climate. It was also pointed out that if a
city may furnish water and still be for a public purpose, it can
furnish ice, which is water in a frozen conditionYt In answer
"Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, mtpra note 2; Clark v. Nash,
198 U. S. 361 (19o5).
"245 U. S. 217 (917).
"Central Lumber Co. v. City of Waseca, 152 Minn. 201, 188 N. W. 275
(1922).
"Ibid.
"Holton v. City of Camilla, 134 Ga. 56o, 68 S. E. 472 (1gio). Also see
Saunders v. Mayor, etc., Town of Arlington, 147 Ga. 581, 94 S. E. 1O22 (igi8),
where the right of a city to establish an ice plant was upheld under a charter
provision which permitted it to issue bonds for making certain enumerated and
"other public improvements."
' Justice Timlin, of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in the case of
State v. Thompson, 149 Wis. 488, 137 N. W. 20 (1912), in a concurring opin-
ion, criticized the frozen water analogy as follows: "But things which are
similar from a physical or chemical viewpoint may be dissimilar from the
legal viewpoint; under a statute authorizing a city to buy coal it probably
could not buy diamonds, although it is said they are chemically identical."
The court in this case refused to uphold the right of Milwaukee to establish
an ice plant but not on the grounds of not being for a public purpose.
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to the objection that the city would be engaging in manufacturing,
the court asked if it might not "perhaps equally as well be said
to be manufacturing when by the use of a filtering process it
changes impure water into that which is pure." When, in con-
nection with a waterworks system a city produces ice, "it merely,
by certain processes, changes the form and temperature of a
part of the water supplied by that system."
The Supreme Court of Louisiana refused to uphold the
operation of an ice plant under a state constitutional provision
that the power of taxation could be exercised by municipalities
only for purposes "strictly public in their nature." 31 The court
refused to accept the frozen water argument of the Supreme
Court of Georgia since "all analogy between the municipal dis-
tribution of water and the municipal distribution of ice is des-
troyed by the fact that for the one business pipes have to be
laid in the public streets, and, necessarily, for doing this, the
streets have to be torn up and disturbed, whereas the other is
a purely competitive business enterprise." The court held that
the analogy would be complete if the city gave up the distribution
of water by pipes and peddled the water; "but everybody would
then see that the town was no longer discharging a sovereign
function, but carrying on a private enterprise."
The right of a city to manufacture and sdll ice to its in-
habitants has also been upheld by the Supreme Court of Ari-
zona.39 The court pointed out that many parts of Arizona have a
climate "almost tropical," and referring to the Maine fuel yard
case, held that if heat was necessary to the health, comfort, and
convenience of the people of the. cities of that state, ice was no
less so to the inhabitants of the cities of Arizona.
The Supreme Court of Missouri has, however, refused to
uphold the power of cities of that state to maintain ice plants
under a constitutional provision that "Taxes may be levied and
collected for public purposes only." 40 The court, to determine
'Union Ice & Coal Co. v. Town of Ruston, 135 La. 898, 66 So. 262 (914).
" Tombstone v. Macia, mspra note 6.
4" State v. Orear, supra note 3. In 'State v. Port of Seattle, iO4 Wash.
634, 177 Pac. 671 Wigg), it was held that the port of Seattle had no authority
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whether the maintenance of an ice plant was for a public purpose
invoked the rule of "whether such business is sanctioned by time
and the acquiescence of the people as being public or private."
Judged by this standard, the court held that the making and
selling of ice by Kansas City to its inhabitants, was not so far
a public purpose as to warrant the expenditure of public money
obtained from the sale of municipal bonds, "the payment of
which, with the interest thereon, must be met by the levy and
collection of public taxes." Ice has but recently, if as yet, been
promoted to a place among the necessities of life according to
the holding of the court; "time was but recently when it was
considered as a luxury only." The court went on to say that
even though it has now become a necessity of life "it is as yet
certainly no greater a necessity to the human race than are
food and clothing." Since, according to the court, no one would
hesitate to say that the latter were not public purposes which the
city could spend money for, it held that an ice plant was as yet
in the same class.
These decisions of the highest courts of the states show that
they are not agreed as to whether the operation'of an ice plant
is a proper municipal function. It seems that this is a question
which might depend upon local conditions; it might be a public
purpose in Arizona with a "climate almost tropical" and not
public in a state where, on account of the different climatic con-
ditions, ice is not such a necessity of life. It may be expected
that when the question is brought before the Supreme Court of
the United States, it will follow the principle of giving the
highest respect to the judgment of the highest court of the state
"upon what should be deemed a public use in a particular state." 41
The right of cities to build and rent buildings, or parts
thereof, has also been questioned as being a proper municipal
function, involving taxation for other than a public purpose. In
determining in a given case whether the erection of a building
tnder the laws creating it to engage in the manufacture and sale of ice. The
decision was made upon the interpretation of the law rather than upon the
question of being for other than a public purpose.
"245 U. S. 217 (917).
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is a proper municipal function, the courts consider whether the
dominating motive for the erection is a strictly public use. If
so, the expenditure for it is legal, although incidentally it may
be devoted occasionally to uses which are not public. 42  In the
case of a public hall, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts has pointed out that if, however, the project of a city is
merely colorable, masking under the pretext of a public purpose,
a general design to enter into the private business of maintaining
a public hall for gain, or devoting it mainly to any other than
its public use as a gathering place for citizens generally, such an
attempt would be a perversion of power and a nullity and no
public funds could be appropriated for it.4 3 The city may rent
part of a building where it conceives that by doing this it may
lighten its burden in the erection of a new building; however, it
has no right as a primary purpose to build buildings to rent.44
The distinction drawn by the authorities is as to the primary ob-
ject of the public expenditure in the erection of the building; the
fact that there is an added expense in the erection of a build-
ing, which standing alone would be unlawful, does not make the
expenditure illegal as not being for a public purpose if the primary
object of the building is to subserve a proper public purpose.45
While a city may not erect buildings for business or specu-
lative purposes, where it has a city hall built in good faith and
used for municipal purposes, it has the right to allow it to be
used incidentally for other purposes. 46  It is no valid objection
to the exercise of the municipal powers that the public will not
make exclusive use of the building.47 The Supreme Judicial Court
of Maine has held that a town did not exceed its powers in mak-
'Wheelock v. City of Lowell, 196 Mass. 220, 81 N. E. 977 (19o7).
"Ibid.
"Bates v. Bassett, 6o Vt. 530, 15 At. 200 (1888) ; White v. Stamford, 37
Com. 578 (187).
" Ibid.
"'Worden v. New Bedford, I3 Mass. 23 (I88i); also see Bell v. Plat-
rifle, 7i Wis. 139, 36 N. W. 831 (1888).
"Denver v. Hallett, 34 Colo. 393, 83 Pac. i066 (1905); also see Egan
v. City and County of San Francisco, 165 Cal. 576, 133 Pac. 294 (1913) ; Wil-
kerson v. City of Lexington, 188 Ky. 381, 222 S. W. 74 (1920) ; State v.
Barnes, 22 Okla. 191, 97 Pac. 997 (i9O8).
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ing a contract to allow a dramatic company the use of its town
house for a period of six years, when not wanted for town pur-
poses, in consideration of money to be expended by the company
in enlarging the building and putting upon it necessary repairs.
48
The court reasoned that the expenditure of money in building the
hall was not to afford encouragement to a dramatic company,
but the end to be attained was to get an improved town hall, and
the contract with the dramatic company was designed as a means
by which it could be accomplished. Since this mode decreased
the amount of money to be raised, it could not be considered as
the expenditure of money primarily for an opera house.
The Supreme Court of Iowa has held that an incorporated
city of twelve hundred population, located in a farming com-
munity, has no power to erect a city building designed for an
opera house with an auditorium, box office, ticket window, stage,
balcony, dressing rooms, etc., even though of the floor space
of about six thousand square feet, twelve hundred square feet
were to be used by the city government for offices, fire depart-
ment, etc.49 The court held that the building was primarily an
opera house; "The town offices and the place for the fire de-
partment were mere incidents to the building." However de-
sirable it might be for rural towns to have a large assembly hall
or opera house, "it is not within the power of the town council
to build it." The question of policy was also considered by the
court which pointed out that because of the liability which would
be attached to the operation of an opera house, "it is a burden
which should not be assumed."
While a city or town may acquire and hold such real estate.
as may be necessary to enable it to carry on its corporate business
and exercise its proper municipal functions, "it is idle to claim
that a municipal corporation can lawfully engage in the business
of buying, selling, or dealing generally in real estate, either as
principal or broker." 50 A city can acquire property for cor-
"Jones v. -Sanford, 66 Me. 585 (1877).
'Brooks v. Town of Brooklyn, 146 Iowa 136, 124 N. W. 868 (igio).
"Hayward v. Board of Trustees of Town of Red Cliff, 20 Colo. 33, 36
Pac. 795 (1894).
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porate purposes only and cannot embark in "speculative ven-
tures," or make any contracts in the nature of "mere invest-
ments." 61
Since, as the above cases indicate, a city cannot build build-
ings where the primary object in view is the rental of them to
individuals, may it go into the "building and loan" business to
the extent of lending money to others to build and develop the
city? The decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts in Lowell v. Boston,5 2 holding unconstitutional a statute
of 1872, authorizing the city of Boston to issue bonds and lend
the proceeds on mortgage to the owners of land, the buildings
upon which were burned by the great fire of that year, indicates
that this could not be done. "The expenditure authorized by the
statute being for private and not for public objects, in a legal
sense, it exceeds the constitutional power of the Legislature; and
the city cannot lawfully issue the bonds for the purposes of the
act," according to the decision of the court.53 But as in the case
of other municipal functions, "times change" and while this ac-
tivity was frowned upon by these earlier decisions, it is possible
that, on account of the changed economic conditions, this may
become a proper municipal activity.
A decision of the Supreme Court of Washington upholding
an act authorizing the raising of funds by taxation for the pur-
chase, improvement and settlement of undeveloped agricultural
lands to be sold later by the state to private individuals indicates
that it might be constitutional for a city to develop sections of the
city and sell to private individuals.5 4 The Washington court
held that the act of the legislature of that state was not uncon-
stitutional as levying a tax for other than a public purpose.
'Hunnicutt v. City of Atlanta, 104 Ga. I, 30 S. E. 500 (1898).
=III Mass. 454 (1873).
'Also see Opinion of the Justices, 211 Mass. 624, 98 N. E. 611 (1912).
L. D. UpsoN, PRAcTIcE or MuNIcIPAL ADMINISTRATION (1926) 568, states
that the city of Milwaukee owns stock in the Garden Homes Company which
is building and disposing of houses at low prices and easy terms. The city of
Los Angeles is also authorized to do this by its new charter.
"State v. Clausen, Iio Wash. 525, 188 Pac. 538 (ig2o). Two of the Jus-
tices dissented on the grounds that this "attractive bit of paternalistic legisla-
tion!' was not for a public purpose.
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The acquisition of golf courses by cities has also been
attacked before the courts as being taxation for other than a
public purpose. The Supreme Court of Oregon has held that
the city of Portland may acquire a golf links, it being a "public
utility" within the meaning of the charter of that city.5' The
right of Minneapolis to acquire a golf course under the home
rule act of that state authorizing cities to take property "needed
for the full discharge of any public function which it is permitted
to exercise," has been upheld by the Supreme Court of Minne-
sota. 56
A new problem arose in the case of the municipally owned
golf course in Louisville, Kentucky.5 7, The city hired a golf
professional, and to induce him to take the position, and for the
convenience of the golf players, provided a place at the golf
course in which to clean and repair clubs, and the professional
was given the privilege of selling golf balls, golf clubs, and other
golf equipment. The merchants in Louisville brought action to
enjoin the board of park commissioners from permitting the
sale of these articles, it being pointed out that the Louisville
merchants were not able to compete with the sale at the municipal
course since the latter had no rent to pay. Was it a proper munic-
ipal function for a city to engage in the sale of golf equipment
in connection with a municipal golf course? The Supreme
Court of Kentucky upheld the right of the city of Louisville to
provide for the sale of this material as being within the purview
of "park purposes ;" the park board not only had the authority to
maintain the golf course but to do "those things which are
reasonably necessary for its proper enjoyment by the public."
Since the golf course was three and one-half miles from the
business part of Louisville and to go from the golf course down
town to get anything needed and come back would take from
forty to sixty minutes ordinarily, the court considered this new
function to be reasonably necessary for the proper enjoyment of
the golf course by the public.
Capen v. City of Portland, 112 Ore. 14, 228 Pac. 1O5 (924).
Boot v. Minneapolis, 163 Minn. 223, 2o3 N. W. 625 (1925).
'Sutcliffe Co. v. City of Louisville, 205 Ky. 718, 266 S. W. 375 (924).
MUNICIPAL FUNCTIONS
The question of the public purpose of various other munic-
ipal functions has also been before the courts. The Supreme
Court of Ohio, in a case before it in 1913, in considering whether
the city of Toledo could own and operate a moving picture
theatre, pointed out that while it was primarily a question under
the Ohio home rule provision, that is, whether the establishment
and operation of a moving picture show is within "the powers
of local self-government," the question as to whether this was a
proper governmental function was also involved. 58 The court
held that it would be an unauthorized use of public money to
acquire a moving picture theatre since property may be taken
only for uses which are public, and little protection of property
rights would be left "if the proceeds of thrift and industry may
be seized for the establishment and operation of moving picture
shows and all other imaginable purposes not more frivolous
nor more remote from the functions of government." It has
also been held that the expenditure of public money for a hockey
rink to be used by a closely allied athletic association for playing
hockey games between salaried teams and where there was to be
an admission charge was not a public purpose.5 9
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in an advisory opinion
handed down in 1871 replying to the question as to whether towns
might "establish manufactories entirely on their own account, and
run them by the ordinary town officers" replied that it could not
be done.6 0 It was pointed out by the court that "Towns are
public corporations, created and existing only for public purposes,
not private corporations for the purpose of traffic or manufac-
turing."
The Supreme Court of South Dakota has upheld the power
of the city of Mitchell to sell bonds for the construction and in-
stallation'of a telephone system.61 In upholding the right of the
city to assume this new function the court said that the test as
to whether taxes could be raised for this purpose and as to
'State v. Lynch, 88 Ohio 7I, io2 N. E. 67o (1913).
'Burns v. Essling, 156 Minn. 1i, i94 N. W. 404 (1923).
' Opinion of the Justices, 58 Me. 590 (1871).
'Spangler v. City of Mitchell, 35 S. D. 335, 152 N. W. 339 (1915).
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whether it could be made the subject of municipal ownership and
control "is, not whether such service is necessary as an exercise
of the functions of municipal government, but whether it is
a public service."
The question was presented to the Supreme Court of Georgia,
in a case before it in 1897, as to whether a city might operate a
plumbing supply store. 2 The city of Waycross claimed that the
power to do this was implied in its right to operate a water works.
The city had purchased plumbing supplies and furnished materials
to, and had work done, for such of its citizens as had applied
to it to have fixtures and pipes placed in and upon their premises.
The city had realized a "reasonable profit" from this work. Since
the city could not show express legislative authority to engage
in the plumbing business such implied power was denied. Thus,
in the "absence of express legislative sanction," a municipal cor-
poration was held to have "no authority to engage in any inde-
pendent business enterprise or occupation such as is usually pur-
sued by private individuals. In other words, its legitimate duty
is to deal with public affairs, and not those which are purely
private and entirely unconnected with a proper administration of
its governmental duties." Since the power had not been given,
the court did not find it necessary to answer this question; it
seems very questionable whether this would be considered a public
purpose even though the power was given. While it would prob-
ably be considered to be a necessity of modern life, it seems as
if it cannot be said that it is not possible to depend upon com-
petitive industry for its supply.
A question which has recently been presented to the courts
is as to whether a city may engage in the sale of gasoline by the
operation of a municipal gasoline filling station.6 3 In 1924 the
city of Lincoln, Nebraska, adopted an amendment to its home rule
charter which provided that the city council have the power to
'Keen v. Waycross, ioi Ga. 588, 29 S. E. 42 (I897).
' Standard Oil Co. v. City of Lincoln, 114 Neb. 243, 2o7 N. W. 172 (1926).
The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska, for the Lincoln
Division, had held in a case before it in 1925 that the sale of gasoline was
a proper function of local government. Mutual Oil Co. v. Zehrung, Ii F. (2d)
887 (D. C. Neb. I925).
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engage in the. business of selling gasoline and oil to the in-
habitants of the city, both at retail and wholesale. The amend-
ment further provided that the city should not charge for
gasoline and oil sold by it, more than the cost thereof to the city,
plus the cost of handling the same, including contingencies. Pur-
suant to this amendment the city council adopted an ordinance
creating a municipal gasoline department for the sale of gasoline
and oil and provided that gasoline be sold to the inhabitants of
the city at cost.
The right of the city to sell gasoline and oil was questioned
on the grounds, among others, that it deprived private dealers
of their property without due process of law since the city was
using public money derived from taxation to carry on the busi-
ness, and that the money so used was for a private purpose and
not for a public purpose. The private dealers argued that the
money so used by the city was not for a public purpose but solely
for the benefit of the purchasers of gasoline and oil. In up-
holding the right of the city to sell gasoline, the Supreme Court
of Nebraska gave much weight to the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of Green v. Frazier,
64
where the acts of the legislature of the state of North Dakota
providing for the establishment of a state bank, a line of ware-
houses and elevators, flour mills and manufacturing establish-
ments, and for the handling of wheat and the manufacture of
flour, and even to the establishment of a home-building association
were held to be not in contravention of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The Supreme Court had held in that case that "when a
state sees fit, for the promotion of the public welfare, to enter
into activities which in the past have been considered as entirely
within the domain of private enterprise and to assist them by
taxation, the wisdom of its legislation or soundness of the eco-
nomic policy involved cannot be considered by this couit in pass-
ing upon the constitutionality of the taxation."
The Nebraska court, in considering the argument made that
the business of selling gasoline had "never been affected with a
public interest" and is now a "purely private business, and uni-
£ 253 U. S. 233 (192o).
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versally recognized as a proper and legitimate field for private
enterprise," pointed out that "gasoline has become one of the
indispensable commercial commodities of our time." A com-
modity of so universal use was held to come within the purview
of "public purpose" as distinguished from "private purpose" and
the city in engaging in the business violated neither the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution nor any provision of the
state constitution. 65
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States which, in a decision handed down in December, 1927, af-
firmed the decision of the Supreme Court of Nebraska.6' The
case was disposed of, without a written opinion, on the authority
of the decisions in Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U. SL 217
(917), and Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233 (1920). In those
cases the court had stated that great weight would be given to
the fact that a state had authorized a municipality to tax with a
view to providing a service and that purpose had been declared
by the highest court of the state to be a public one. Evidently
the court was unable to see any "demonstrated usurpation of
power" having "no reasonable relation to the execution of lawful
purposes" which would justify judicial interference.
The consideration of these cases shows the gradual extension
of the law of public purpose as applied to municipal functions.
Things formerly felt to be entirely within the domain of private
competitive enterprise are now being assumed by municipalities
as a proper governmental function. The usual attack made
upon such increased activity is that in using money raised by tax-
ation for such use, it is for other than a public purpose and con-
sequently unconstitutional. The courts in deciding upon the le-
'In White Eagle Oil & Refining Co. v. Gunderson, 205 N. W. 614 (S. D.
x925), where the question of the right of the state of South Dakota to engage
in the sale of gasoline was presented to the Supreme Court of that state, it
was held that taxation for this purpose was unconstitutional. The court held
that there was nothing essentially different in the business of retailing gaso-
line from that of any other commodity and "while it may be conceded that
gasoline under present economic conditions is a necessity, there is no reason
why it may not be retailed by private enterprise." To use money derived from
state taxation to engage in such enterprise was held to contravene that provi-
sion of the state constitution providing that "Taxes . . . shall be levied and
collected for public purposes only."
'2 Standard Oil Co. v. City of Lincoln, decided Dec. 5, 1927.
MUNICIPAL FUNCTIONS
gality of such functions have taken what might be termed a
liberal or progressive attitude. They have not arbitrarily re-
fused to permit a thing at a later date because at some earlier
time it had been held to be other than a legitimate public pur-
pose. Public purpose as applied to taxation is a changing con-
cept. It is fortunate that the courts have not placed a narrow
interpretation upon the law of public purpose but have been cog-
nizant of the fact that times change.
The question arises as to the future of municipal functions
from the point of view of the law of public purpose. If a city
may engage in the sale of gasoline to its inhabitants, what are
the limits beyond which it may not go? Why may it not enter
upon any kind of commercial enterprise and operate a grocery
store or a meat market or a bakery? The Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine has laid down two tests of public purpose, which
have been accepted by the Supreme Court of the United States:
is the article a necessity of life, and is it, under present economic
conditions not regulated by competition in the ordinary channels
of private business enterprise? It seems questionable whether the
sale of gasoline measures up to these two tests. Even though it
is granted that it is a necessity of life, can it be said that gaso-
line is not "under present economic conditions, regulated by com-
petition in the ordinary channels of private business enterprise."
The object in establishing a municipal gasoline station to
sell gasoline at cost would quite probably be to reduce prices
charged by private dealers. The Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts in an advisory opinion given in 1903, in considering
this question, said that "it would be a perversion of the function of
government for the state to enter as a competitor into the field
of industrial enterprise, with a view either to the profit that could
be made through the income to be derived from the business,
or to the indirect gain that might result to purchasers if prices
were reduced by governmental competition." 6 But that was in
1903 and "times change" and with them the law of public pur-
pose and municipal functions have changed.
Go182 Mass. 6o5, 66 N. E. 25 (1903).
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A thing may be a public purpose at one time and not be
such at a later period. The New York and New Jersey legis-
latures in I9M7 authorized their cities to buy and sell food in
time of emergency. The New York law was upheld by the
Supreme Court of that state as a war emergency measure; 67 a
thing which is valid only as an emergency measure at one time
may become legal later, even in the absence of emergency, due to
the changed economic conditions.
The extension of municipal functions has to a large degree
come to be a question of public policy, subject to the final check
of taxation only for a public purpose where public policy moves
too fast. But in applying the check, the courts seem to have
kept up with the spirit of the times and intervene only in ex-
ceptional cases. The attitude of the Supreme Court of the"
United States is to leave the matter to the states, and when the
purpose is declared by the highest court of the state to be a
public one, it will give great weight to that decision and inter-
fere only in clearly arbitrary and unreasonable cases. "Times"
and economic conditions will unquestionably change in the future
and with them the law of public purpose and municipal func-
tions.
'Howard v. City of New York, igg App. Div. 596, i9i N. Y. Supp. 878
(1922) ; reversed on other grounds, 236 N. Y. gI, i4o N. E. 2o6 (1923).
